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THE BATTLE OVER STOCKHOLDERS VOICE:  
 
A CRITIQUE OF AGAR V. JUDY AND THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW PROBLEM IN MANIPULATION OF 





Wars have many fronts.  The battle lines in the fight between the 
director and stockholder control models of the world have evolved 
dramatically since the early days of the shareholder activism 
movement.1  The past few years have seen a remarkable proliferation 
not only in the amount of stockholder engagements, but also in the 
sophistication of their attacks on corporations.  Specifically, public 
communication of grievances about intracorporate issues has become 
a prevalent approach through which the more active stockholders 
privately police director performance on a real-time basis and seek to 
influence corporate policy.  Objectives for stockholder public 
engagement vary, but typically include (1) executive compensation 
                                                           
 
* Yair Even-Tal is a member of the Special Situations Research of 
Institutional Shareholders Service Governance, whose practice focuses on 
engaging with corporate boards, stockholders, and other stakeholders 
regarding mergers and acquisitions, proxy contests and corporate governance 
disputes.  The author wishes to thank Prof. Amir N. Licht, Joel Friedlander 
and Prof. Mohsen Maneshfor their kind comments, suggestions, and 
discussions relating to prior drafts of this article and its subject matter.     
1 See generally Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, 
The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. Applied 
Corp. Fin. 55 (2007) (tracing history of the U.S. stockholder activism); L. 
Talner, The Origins of Shareholder Activism, at 2 (Investor Responsibility 
Research Center, 1983); see also R. Marens, Investing Corporate 
Governance: The Mid-Century Emergence of Shareholder Activism, 8(4) J. 
Bus. & Mgmt. 371, 373 (2002). 
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reforms; (2) capital structure changes; (3) new  business strategy; (4) 
business combinations (e.g., merger, sale, spin off, termination of a 
transaction); (5) governance initiatives; (6) board representation; and 
(7) management changes.2  This once rarely employed model of 
stockholder engagement, using extra-judicial communication 
activism to exert pressure on managements to bring leadership and 
operational changes and asking 
rally around them, signaled a marked change in the dynamic of the 
governance landscape that may become a significant concern for 
incumbent managements.  The response of corporate America was 
swift.  Consistent with the tendency of practitioners to push the limits 
of the acceptable, boards of directors sought to block both the front 
engagement, using litigation under the guise of purported libel 
against those stockholders who voiced their opposition.    
The libel litigation tactic posed two questions previously 
unanswered by the Delaware courts, or the judiciary in general.  The 
first question was jurisdictional, in a sense: put colloquially, should 
boards be authorized to engage in defensive action even if the 
action is taken in the absence of actual, subjective improper motive
other stockholders, as well as stockholders voting rights?  Second, if 
so, by what standard of review should the courts evaluate the actions 
of directors that might impair stockholders franchise and First 
Amendment rights?      
In early 2017, the Delaware Court of Chancery faced these two 
fundamental questions in the momentous decision of Agar v. Judy,3 
                                                           
 
2 Decisions regarding these matters are exclusively within corporate 
See DEL. CODE ANN. 
business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under 
permitted to interfere with -making 
has provoked intense debate, but that is for another article. 
3 Agar v. Judy, 151 A.3d 456 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
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but did not address the need for balancing the competing policies of 
-law right to stockholder franchise against the 
of the right to communicate with other stockholders of the company. 
In a first treatment by the judiciary about when a fight letter can 
give rise to a defamation claim, the Judy litigation involved 
defamation claims brought by incumbent directors of a small-cap 
company for contentious statements made by a group of dissident 
stockholders amidst contest for control.4  Explaining that directors 
are public figures for electoral-related communication purposes, the 
Court held that as the party challenging the stockhold
the directors bore the evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the 
purported statements were false and made with malice.5 
While the Judy ruling is significant in that it appears to give 
stockholders, of privately and publicly-owned corporations alike, 
broader leeway in exercising their First Amendment rights in regard 
to intra-corporate communications,6 the decision did not relieve 
much of the risk of gamesmanship and concerns about abuse and 
intimidation by boards of directors.  That is, in its decision, the 
Chancery Court focused only on after-the-fact case-specific review of 
the director- onduct by balancing their tort law right to 
reputation against the constitutional First Amendment rights of the 
dissident stockholder group, without addressing the necessity of a 
normative duty that would ensure good faith conduct and safeguard 
stockholder
or, alternatively, an enforceable standard of review to hold fiduciaries 
accountable if their maneuver results in wrongful interference with 
7  This failure to impose a 
                                                           
 
4 Agar v. Judy, 151 A. 3d 456 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
5 See id. at 459. 
6 I refer interchangeably to forms of discourse between a company's 
 
7 See id. 
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with other stockholders against, or penalize the incumbent directors 
for wrongfully suing stockholders for statements that were mere 
opinion, creates a pervasive incenti
First Amendment rights and highlights the danger of undermining the 
integrity of the stockholder vote given that such impermissible 
behavior would not give rise to liability.     
In the pages that follow, I argue that these policy concerns 
emphasize that a stricter approach to regulation of fiduciary conduct 
involving manipulations of First Amendment rights is warranted 
given the potential for unfair exploitation of the stockholder 
electorate.  Specifically, this article calls on the courts to engage in a 
substantive evaluation of actions by directors that effectively cut off 
of defamation litigation.  The heightened form of judicial scrutiny 
would focus on whether objective circumstances establish that 
management acted for requisite improper purpose to interfere with 
of actual, subjective improper motive on the part of the board.  This 
proposed approach would allow the courts to consider the dynamic 
factors in play and achieve a sensible balance between tort law rights 
against defamation and ensuring that directors are in fact accountable 
to stockholders at the ballot box, and do not inequitably interfere 
with their right to communicate with other stockholders of the 
company. 
Before examining high-salience contexts that reflect the 
justification for the proposed stricter approach to fiduciary 
regulation, it is helpful to review the public policy values that 
warrant imposing the additional safeguards when such potential for 
abuse emerges.    
 
THE (IN)ESCAPABLE COLLUSION COURSE:  
THE TENSION BETWEEN STOCKHOLDERS ENGAGEMENT AND 
OUR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
Efforts of those who thrust themselves into a spotlight to quash 
criticism, fair or unfair, are nothing new.  One manner to achieve the 
desired goal of deterring a targeted section of the public from 
exercising their constitutional right of free speech is through 
litigation and its associated rents.  The oppressive tactic of initiating 
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a libel action against those who expressed 
has not only 
among the individuals at which the threat of litigation has been 
directed, but also among the targeted audience at large.8  The tactical 
approach of bringing defamation litigation with the intent to 
intimidate and silence had thus posed risks to the societal interests 
and public policy values that our courts have been vigilant to protect. 
This type of gamesmanship gives rise to policy concerns to a 
greater extent when employed by corporate fiduciaries given their 
unique relationship and duties owed to their beneficiaries.  It is not 
surprising then that unduly libelous actions brought by incumbent 
directors to inhibit criticism of management through 
communication with other stockholders of the company have been 
attracting a great deal of interest from the media, practitioner and 
academy. 
Investors, unlike other groups of the general public or 
unaffiliated corporate stakeholders such as controllers, officers and 
directors of a company commit their capital indefinitely to the firm, 
but yet retain limited mechanisms to effectively and timely monitor 
managerial conduct9 and its accompanied ever-present risk of 
                                                           
 
8 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: 
Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1978); see also 
Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1633, 1649-50 (2013); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact 
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 268 (1985); Daniel J. Solove, The First 
Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 142 (1997); 
Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 
832-40 (1969). 
9 Often cited corporate accountability devices include: (1) intra-
corporate regulation in the form of independence and governance rules that 
regulate director conduct; (2) intensive surveillance of large institutional 
Shareholder Services; (4) reputation, social, personal, and professional 
constraints; (5) state corporation law, the concomitant risk of shareholder 
litigation, and the threat (even if, nevertheless, is still rare) of real personal 
liability. 
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disloyal or careless actions.  Policing director behavior on a real-time 
basis, as well as protecting against misappropriation of stockholder 
wealth and other improper fiduciary interference with  
rights, are subject to even greater difficulties in privately-held 
corporations; which are subject only to minimum disclosure 
regulatory state regimes, thus creating a unique asymmetry 
information problem.10  This gap of adequate and oversight 
mechanism devices mechanisms to ensure managerial corporate 
accountability that gave rise to the emerging role of exercising the 
constitutional right of free speech as a potent safeguard against the 
omnipresent specter of director misconduct.  Indeed, entrusted with 
the exclusive authority to manage the business and  
affairs of the corporation,11 equity developed a modern accountability 
regime backed by fiduciary principles for addressing the acute power 
asymmetries in relations between managers of the firm and its 
12 
actions have thus been subjected to pervasive duties of loyalty and 
care when exercising their broad powers over corporate property and 
processes.  Yet, while legal actions against corporate fiduciaries 
                                                           
 
10 Malone v. Brincat
a request for shareholder action, the Delaware General Corporation Law does 
not require directors to provide shareholders with information concerning 
11 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 
undamental principles of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law statute is that the business affairs of a corporation 
DEL 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a))); see also Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 
1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. 
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 
(Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); 
TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14 (Del. 
not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of 
 
12 See Amir Licht, Lord Eldon Redux: Information Asymmetry, 
Accountability and Fiduciary Loyalty, OXFORD J.L. STUD., 1 (Apr. 06, 2017) 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqx003. 
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serve as partial, imperfect traditional mechanism to redress unfaithful 
conduct and deter improper managerial behavior,13 these ex-post 
judicial reviews are often outweighed by excessive litigation costs 
and substantial uncertainty, and thus far from providing investors 
adequate protection against fiduciary misconduct.  Similarly, other 
mechanisms for making those at the helm of the corporate enterprise 
accountable for failing to serve the stockholders interests, namely 
replacing directors via the ballot box, are rare themselves, due to 
hurdles such as multi-class capital structures, costs,14 limited  
access to the ballot,15 and staggered boards,16 stockholders seeking a 
change in the management team must cross.17 
                                                           
 
13 In re Anderson Clayton S'holder Litig., 1988 WL 97480, at *5 
(Del. C
actions in the enforcement of the fiduciary duties assumed by corporate 
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) 
((quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (
corporate democracy and the derivative suit are potent tools to redress the 
 
14 N. Gantchev The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a 
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. Fin. Econ. 610 (2013) (finding evidence 
that costs associated with dueling consent solicitations average $10.7 
million); Hills Stores Company v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 100 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(dismissing challenge by the winning slate in a proxy contest to the payment 
of severance upon the change of control to certain executives of the 
company). 
15 DEL. CODE ANN..tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (codifying proxy access rules 
for Delaware corporations).  These rules authorize corporations to adopt 
bylaws that include procedures and conditions to stockholders nominations 
in director elections, which may include: (1) minimum stock ownership and 
duration of ownership by the nominating stockholder; (2) limitation on the 
number of directors that may be nominated; (3) preclusion of nominations by 
persons who have acquired a certain percentage of stock ownership, or who 
have publicly proposed to acquire such a percentage.  See also Financial 
CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending  ownership 
stakes and holding periods requirements for publicly-held corporations' 
stockholders to put a proposal for a vote);  San Antonio Fire & Police 
Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 983 A.2d 304, (Del. Ch. 
2009), afl'd, 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009) (rejecting a challenge to a change of 
control covenant in a bond indenture permitting the noteholders of the 
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Thus, facing such uphill battles, one of the few viable avenues 
incentivize them to serve the corporate interest is exercising their 
constitutional First Amendment rights.  Engaging in communication 
with other stockholders of the company regarding intra-corporate 
related matters from management misconduct and outperformance 
vital function for stockholders to raise their concerns in order to push 
for an amicable engagement or change by gaining support for a 
collective stockholder action.  Therefore, an attempt by directors to 
deprive stockholders of the right to voice their critique, under the 
guise of non-pretextual justification, raises the question of whether, 
and if so to what degree, similar situationally conflicted fiduciary 
conducts warrant a hard look by courts.   
                                                                                                                 
 
company to redeem their notes at face value if the company underwent a 
fundamental change of control). 
16 DEL CODE ANN.  tit. 8, § 141(d) (expressly permits a certificate of 
incorporation or bylaw provision that provides for a classified or staggered 
board). 
17 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder 
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 67
not provide the solid foundation for the legitimacy of directorial power that it 
Takeover Bids vs. 
Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 8633, 2001), 
be better at leading the firm, convincing fellow stockholders that this is the 
case would likely require significant efforts with no guarantee of success.  
Stockholders would be making their choices under conditions of uncertainty: 
to vote for the rival team, they must be convinced not only that the 
-par, but also that the rival team would likely 
perform better.  Otherwise, stockholders might well choose to stay with the 
see also Transcript of Motion to Expedite Ruling,
Flagship Master Fund, LP v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2017-0165 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2017) (challenge to  requiring 
 director nominees to be included in  the target's proxy 
statement). 
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AGAR V. JUDY: THE DIFFICULTIES OF RECONCILING  
THE RIGHT TO INTRA-CORPORATE COMMUNICATION WITH 
FIDUCIARIES  RIGHT AGAINST DEFAMATION 
This long ignored knotty issue of whether managerial actions 
brought with the goal particularly 
during an active proxy contest with defeat of plaintiff directors 
looming, warrant judicial intervention had not been addressed by 
the courts, neither in Delaware nor elsewhere, until a recent measured 
yet important step has been made to establish rules of the road in the 
case of Agar v. Judy.18  In a first treatment by a Delaware court about 
when contentious stockholder engagement in the form of a fight 
letter can give rise to a defamation claim, the Court of Chancery 
fashioned an approach to balance the competing interests of 
tutional First Amendment rights of 
Although the 
resulted in a largely fact-intensive ruling, as is often the case in 
defamation cases, it encompasses important ramifications for repeat 
players in the Chancery Theater, as well as for many observers of 
corporate governance outside circles of Rodney Square.   
The conflict in Judy stemmed from a poorly performing 
2015 stockholders meeting, at which a group of 
unaffiliated stockholders opposed the reelection of the incumbent 
directors following many years of corporate functions that had not 
been carried out and alleged directorial misconducts occurred.19  In 
advance of the annual meeting, at which three of the incumbent 
directors eventually lost their seat, the dissident group signed a letter 
which they distributed to a large number of the company's 
stockholders.20 
                                                           
 
18 Judy, 151 A.3d 456. 
19 Id. at 479. 
20 Id. 
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The circulated letter included a series of statements that accused 
the company directors of acting to benefit themselves by engaging in 
self-dealing, wasteful, and unapproved transactions.21  In addition to 
the allegation of corporate resources misuse, the letter informed its 
recipients that the incumbents have concealed from the stockholders 
the existence of court orders entered against the company in  lawsuits 
brought by its stockholders and noteholders,22 as well as that it has 
                                                           
 
21 The series of statements included the following accusations 
[T]hey were planning to loot [the Company] 
lawsuits, we have received documents that show in particular [incumbents] 
have engaged in looting the Company. Since June of 2014, [the incumbent 
directors] have siphoned over $7 million in cash and stock to themselves and 
 (3 Carole Downs is now the leader ... and is in the 
process of looting the Company along with 
incumbents] siphoned over $7 million in cash and stock to themselves and 
) 
to drag this out and siphon your money out at their leisure. [the incumbent 
board] owe you their fiduciary duty to protect the Company assets but 
and 
time to act and stop them from taking your money. We must remove them 
from their positions before it i  
22 
incumbent directors are] so afraid of you finding out what they are up to that 
one of the first things they did when they took over was to take away your 
right to call for a shareholder meeting by eliminating that provision in the 
Company Bylaws (They even tried to hide this from us until the Court forced 
lasted into December of 2014, the Company was forced kicking and 
screaming to settle. This loss shocked them to change their plans and forced 
that the Court has a restraining order prohibiting them from distributing any 
funds to preferred and common stock holders until the lawsuit in Delaware 
them that they had to pay the accrued dividends and liquidation preference 
ey disclose to you that they 
were forced by the Court to hold a shareholder meeting on June 22, 2015 (the 
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breached contractual obligations to preferred stockholders.23  The 
letter concluded by urging the stockholders to replace the incumbent 
board.24  The removed directors then brought a claim for defamation.  
The dissidents moved to dismiss. 
The Court of Chancery granted the dissidents' motion to dismiss 
in part, holding that corporate directors may be public figures for 
purposes of electoral-related communications.  Thus, exercise of the 
First Amendment right to free speech on intra-corporate issues by 
stockholders would not give rise to liability absent a showing in 
addition to all other necessary elements of a defamation claim that 
the statements made were false and made with actual malice.25 
The rationale for holding corporate directors as public figures 
under the tort and constitutional law standards, the Judy Court 
explained, was two-fold.  First, nominees who run for and take 
corporate office as directors, voluntarily expose themselves to 
attention and comment on their actions by stockholders, who monitor 
their performance.26 The second rationale for recognizing fiduciaries 




23 Id. at 468.  ((1) 
owed on the notes. They were not going to pay the accrued dividends on 
preferred stock. They were not going to pay liquidation preference to 
outstanding preferred stock. They were not going to pay anything on the GX 
License claims. They reduced stock owned by individuals that had been 
that $60 million [in cash the Company received from a transaction] will be 
down to less than $5 million and [the incumbent directors are] threatening to 
renege on their promise to you to liquidate and make a distribution to 
. 
24 Id. at 467-68. 
25 Id. at 477. 
26 Id. at 479 (explaining that the voluntary choice of corporate 
candidates to thrust themselves in the forefront and endure publicity when 
seeking to be elected to lead corporations was a key justification in viewing 
them as a public figure for the electoral-related communications purposes). 
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as public figures, the Court observed, is that access to corporate 
funds that directors can deploy to communicate with investors by 
multiple means, enables them to counter criticism and expose 
fallacies.27 
In considering whether the director-plaintiffs were deemed 
public figures, the Court found that by seeking reelection after 
prevailing at a hotly-contested proxy contest in the last elections held 
in 2013, the director-plaintiffs voluntarily assumed the risk of injury 
from defamatory falsehood and therefore were deemed public 
figures.28  Elaborating on its reasoning, the Court noted that the 
 that the dissident group 
continuously opposed them, and that both the dissidents and the other 
stockholders had monitored their actions, served as further evidence 
that the removed directors exposed themselves to the risk of closer 
scrutiny.29  The Court then went further and emphasized the 
importance of the  greater access to channels of effective 
communication, namely the ability to utilize internal corporate 
information to respond to the allegations of misconduct by 
instructing the  employees to develop rebuttals to the 
 contentions as well as  control of the content of 
the circulated proxy materials, in supporting the conclusion that the 
director-plaintiffs were public figures within the community of the 
30 
With those overarching considerations in mind, the Court turned 
to assess whether the statements made in the fight letter were 
defamatory.  Starting its examination by considering the statements 
of the wrongful wealth transfer, the Court determined that given that 
the investors knew that the parties were staunch adversaries engaged 
in a lengthy duel over the control of the Company, the investors 
would consider those statements as a constitutionally protected 
                                                           
 
27 Id. at 480. 
28 Id. at 479. 
29 Id. at 479-80. 
30 Id. at 480. 
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expression of opinion, rather than statement of fact.31  In further 
support of its holding, the Court explained that proxy fight letters 
are pitches for a cause, and tend towards emphatic language in order 
to sway shareholders to the dissident's side which therefore made it 
Looting Allegations as alleging 32  Hence, the 
Court concluded, the looting statements were constitutionally 
protected opinion under the First Amendment and therefore not 
actionable. 
Next, the Court turned to assess whether the concealment 
allegations could give rise to liability as libelous.  Finding that the 
incumbent directors failed to meet their burden of proof and establish 
that the statements made in connection with judicial orders which 
were entered against them in multiple actions were not 
substantially true, the Court concluded that the concealment 
allegations were nonactionable as defamatory.33 
The Court then turned to the removed final 
challenge the payment allegations that included accusations that the 
incumbents planned to cause the Company to breach its contractual 
obligations and prolong distributions to its investors by engaging in a 
related-party transaction.  Failing to proffer any evidence that 
supported their assertions, the Court held, that at the pleadings stage, 
it was reasonably conceivable that these statements were known by 
dissident group to be false or alternatively made with reckless 
disregard of the truth.34  Therefore, the Court granted the motion to 
dismiss as to payment allegations.   
Judy decision is undoubtedly a game 
changer for stockholders in a couple of respects.  First, called to the 
                                                           
 
31 Id. at 484-85. 
32 Id. at 484 (quoting Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The 
Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations § 12.8 (3d ed. 
2015)). 
33 Id. at 486-87. 
34 Id. 
            SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 





reputation, the Court acknowledged for the first time the need for 
protection of the right to communicate with other investors of the 
company.  Presented with this novel and seemingly irreconcilable 
rights to free speech in intracorporate contexts by requiring that 
aggrieved incumbent fiduciaries who bring defamation claims for 
such communications, bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating 
that the statements were false and made with malice.  Thus, imposing 
heightened constitutional pleading requirements for establishing 
liability for defamation, the Court in Judy provided all stockholders, 
whether of a privately or publicly-owned company, broader 
protection against wrongful managerial interference with the exercise 
of their free speech and voting rights.   
Second, the Judy decision presumably extends beyond proxy 
contest fight letters to different stockholders engagements, such as 
 
The Vice- ing in Judy, however, raises corporate 
law policy concerns.   The decision seems to overlook that the 
incumbents of the Company in Judy wrongfully sued, using 
corporate funds, the proponent stockholders about statements that 
were mere opinion.  Failing to condemn and impose sanctions on 
fiduciaries for engaging in an impermissible action creates a 
pervasive incentive for fiduciaries to continue in their attempt to 
block stockholders from meaningfully and effectively monitor their 
behavior, further isolating themselves from accountability, as well as 
exercising their core rights to free speech and voting. 
director-
isolation, rather than establishing normative duty to safeguard against 
interests to reputation on the one hand and free speech on the other, 
without determining whether fiduciary interference with these rights 
meet equitable standard of conduct of corporate directors, leads to 
concerns about opportunism, imposition of unnecessary costs on 
stockholders and overall wealth creation.   Alternatively, the Court 
had not seized the opportunity to determine whether board 
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-corporate 
communication should trigger corporate law standard of review. 
To illustrate the need of establishing a standard of review under 
which director liability will be judged in circumstances of potential 
manipulation of the stockholders franchise, consider the following 
examples.  A publicly-traded company engaged in the production and 
sale of rare earth minerals has recently completed an initial public 
offering.  Despite the capital raising, the company struggles 
financially due to underestimation of significant costs necessary to 
modernize and expand its facilities, as well as a spike in prices of rare 
earth minerals, which are subject to boom-bust pricing cycles.  
Shortly after the IPO, certain preferred stockholders who hold 
registration rights demanded registration of their shares, which they 
eventually sold in a significant profit.  During the same timeframe, 
the company lagged behind its capital budget.  Management also 
learned that an anticipated loan guarantee would not come through, 
jeopardizing a joint venture opportunity.  
stockholders again demanded registration of their shares, which they 
sold in a profit.  At the time of both the private offerings, the 
company board consisted of eight members, seven of whom either 
sold stock or were affiliated with the preferred stockholders who sold 
stock in offerings.  A couple of months later, prices of rare earth 
minerals dropped.  Significantly lagging behind its capital budget, the 
company raised debt through a private note offering as well as capital 
through stock sales at a deep discount compared to sale prices at 
which the preferred stockholders sold their shares. 
In the lack of standard of conduct and standard of review to 
check potential abuse of power in situations of directorial actions 
such as the filing of the 
defamation suit minority stockholders would be discouraged to 
monitor managerial actions that may be viewed as interested, 
suboptimal to the corporation, as illustrated by the example above.  
The absence of a judicial review standard of such unleashed 
managerial actions, gives rise to the policy concern of 
disproportionate incentives of boards of directors to take interested 
actions to wrongfully interfere with the exercise of the constitutional 
right to speech without being held accountable.  That is, the current 
regime where stockholders can be held liable for libel by mere after-
the-fact showing that they exercised their First Amendment rights on 
incomplete information and thus acted with reckless disregard, while 
fiduciaries are not accountable for acting on the expense of the cestui 
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incentives of real-time management monitoring.  
This risk of erecting unreasonable barriers to stockholder 
other investors of the company is virtually always made with less 
than perfect information.  Despite federal and Delaware corporate 
financial projections relevant to transactional votes,35 material 
conflicts of interest,36 and the process used to reach decisions,37 no 
                                                           
 
35 See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., Shareholders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 
they have large informational advantages that can only be imperfectly 
overcome by the special committee process, which almost invariably 
involves directors who are not involved in the day-to-day management of the 
subsidiary.  The retention of financial advisors by special committees is 
designed to offset some of this asymmetry, and it would seem to be in full 
keeping with that goal for the minority stockholders to be given a summary 
of the core analyses of these advisors in circumstances in which the 
stockholders must protect themselves in the voting or tender process.  That 
this can be done without great burden is demonstrated by the many 
. 
36 See, e.g., , 41 A.3d 432, 434 
record is filled with debatable negotiating and tactical 
choices made by El Paso fiduciaries and advisors.  Absent a conflict of 
interest, these debatable choices could be seen as the sort of reasonable . . . 
ones that must be made in a world of uncertainty. After discovery, however, 
these choices now must be viewed more skeptically, as the key negotiator on 
behalf of the Board and a powerfully influential financial advisor each had 
 
37 See, e.g., In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. Shareholders Litig., 924 A.2d 
171, 177, 209 (Del. Ch. 2007), judgment entered sub nom. In re Netsmart 
Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation 
it currently stands, 
conclusion that strategic buyers in 2006 would not have been interested in 
Netsmart as it existed at that time. . . . [It seems] important for Netsmart to at 
least disclose this judicial decision or otherwise provide a fuller, more 
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other area of the law 
as significant as the corporate governance landscape.  The reason for 
the grave asymmetry problem is encompassed in the fact that 
statutory mechanism of inspecting corporate books and records does 
not level the playing field, mainly because stockholders who seek to 
obtain access to corporate records are required to establish that an 
alleged wrongdoing, which is the very subject of the investigation 
sought, occurred and overcome merits defenses without access to the 
underlying facts.38  Thus, stockholders often fail to satisfy this 
requirement because the reason the very claims for books and records 
are based on what a stockholder seeks to investigate.   
Another set of situations wher
 
finding a strategic buyer. As the Proxy now stands, its description of that 
issue leads one to the impression that a more reasoned and thorough 
decision-making process had been used, and that the process was heavily 
influenced by earlier searches for a strategic buyer that provided a reliable 
basis for concluding that no strategic buyer  
38 The right of stockholders to demand inspection of books and 
records is by nature conditional, subjected to statutorily, judicial, and 
corporate-imposed, restrictions that limit stockholders access to intra-
corporate information.  See 8 Del. C. § 220; Nw. Indus., Inc. v. B.F. 
Goodrich Co.
Even legal vehicles for obtaining information about the corporation, such as 
where a stockholder sues to compel inspection if her demand is refused or 
not answered by initiating a section 220 action, which contemplates 
summary and expedited proceedings that emphasizes prompt processing and 
disposition, to investigate purported improper transactions, inquire into 
management inadequacies, or for communication-related purposes, often 
defeat stockholder urgent, time sensitive need to address a rising corporate 
wrongdoing on a real-time basis.  Scott v. Boca Bancorp, C.A. No. 22649, 
slip op. at 1 (Del. Ch. 1990) (stating that expedited treatment not automatic 
unless only stock list sought). 
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communication right to an appropriate standard of review arises in 
suspicious, yet permissible actions.   
Take, for example, a saving and loan publicly-held company 
whose board of directors has recently approved a number of 
amendments to the bylaws due to media publications that a notorious 
investment fund firm has considered to increase its stake in the 
Company due to its recent disappointing performance.  The first 
amendment increased the threshold for nominating candidates to the 
board from 10% to 30%.  The second requiring 80% supermajority 
voting requirement to amend the bylaws and provisions related to the 
staggered board from seven to five, which results in one seat rather 
than three
meeting.      
Given the apparent bona fide actions of the board, which was not 
faced with a proxy contest or an expected proxy contest when it 
acted, the lack of a standard of review of fiduciary actions that have 
-corporate 
communication rights such as pretextual defamation claim
 
Thus, the increasing importance of real-time monitoring of 
corporate actions further emphasizes the need of establishing an 
accountability mechanism against wrongful interference with 
right to speech, even where there is no clear conflict of interest 
between the directors and the stockholders, must bestir deep judicial 
suspicion to ensure that the legitimacy of the corporate structure 
itself is not undermined.  Or stated bluntly, Judy emphasizes the need 
of formulating doctrinal principles outside the realm of the First 
Amendment sphere, to provide strong-form protection where director 
to free speech and voting. 
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SEARCHING FOR THE OPTIMAL BALANCE BETWEEN 
STOCKHOLDERS  COMMUNICATION RIGHTS AND CORPORATE 
LAW PUBLIC POLICY 
right to elect directors is in the first instance 
statutory.  Corporate law statutes, in an effort to achieve 
accountability of corporate fiduciaries, however imprecisely, requires 
that an annual meeting of stockholders be held for the election of 
directors.39 
Occasionally, boards act in a manner though not specifically 
prohibited by the statute nor inherently nefarious that may have the 
effect of interfering with or impeding the effective exercise of 
corporate democracy by stockholders, especially when a contest of 
control is in the background.  Keeping with the traditional vigilance 
of ensuring the fairness of the process by which directors are elected, 
courts have approached such directorial interventions that  
40 irrespective of 
technical compliance with the corporation law statute.41
                                                           
 
39 E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b)-(c). 
40 E.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 
carefully reviewing any board actions designed to interfere with or impede 
the effective exercise of corporate democracy by shareholders, especially in 
an e Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 
Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating [management] in office; and, 
to that end, for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident 
stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest 
State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless 
Sys. Corp., 2000 WL 1805376, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that although 
compelling justification for the adjournment); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 
771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000) (enjoining, under Blasius, the board's 
and declassify the board, to preemptively amend the bylaws to eliminate the 
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To deal with the complexity of director actions that improperly 
interfere with a vote touching upon matters of corporate control, the 
Delaware courts in a classic manifestation of the concept of 
separation of powers have placed the burden of persuasion on 
                                                                                                                 
 
ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause, eliminate 
require a supermajority shareholder vote to amend the bylaws in the future); 
Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *11-12, *18 (Del. Ch. 1999); 
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988); 
Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980) 
 made it 
impossible to comply with an advance notice bylaws requirement after 
learning about insurgent's intention to wage a proxy fight). 
41 Schnell, 
action does not become permissible simply because 
Marino v. Patriot Rail Co. -1967 
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court . . . rendered untenable the strong-
form contention that a statutory grant of authority necessarily foreclosed 
fidu see also Adolphe A. Berle, Corporate Powers As 
Powers In Trust
corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to 
do with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable 
rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust 
to the trustee's exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument 
Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 672 (Del. Ch. 
-tested'  once by 
accord Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. 
Vertin
adheres to the twice-testing pri
(TABLE); Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 641 (Del. Ch. 
-tested, once for statutory compliance and 
ig., 808 A.2d 
independent legal significance] alters the fundamental rule that inequitable 
actions in technical conformity with statutory law can be restrained by 
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boards to justify their actions in order to strictly police inequitable 
inhibitions of the stockholder franchise.42 
                                                           
 
42 In re T , 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(explaining that enhanced scrutiny applies to specific, recurring, and readily 
identifiable situations involving potential conflicts of interest where the 
realities of the decision-making context can subtly undermine the decisions 
of even independent and disinterested directors.  Inherent in those situations 
are subtle structural and situational conflicts that do not rise to a level 
sufficient to trigger entire fairness review, but also do notcomfortably permit 
expansive judicial deference
take a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal interests 
short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board.");  see Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176, 180 82 (Del. 
1986) (applying Unocal test to the sale of a corporation in light of concern 
that the directors rebuffed a premium acquisition offer and agreed to a white 
litigation by noteholders);  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 954 (Del. 1985) (creating enhanced scrutiny to address the 
may be influenced by and act to further their own interests or those of 
 corporation and its 
, 41 A.3d 432, 
 potential sale of a corporation has enormous 
implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range of human 
motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can inspire 
MM Cos., Inc. 
v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1129 (Del. 2003) (extending the rubric 
of enhanced scrutiny to incorporate the principles that animated Chancellor 
Allen's decision in Blasius 
enhanced s Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 
929 A.2d 786, 811 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 
92 n.3 (Del. 1992) (holding that enhanced scrutiny applies whenever a board 
omitted);  Gilbert v. El Paso Corp., 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990) 
(holding that a court must apply enhanced scrutiny whenever the board acts 
t see also Gregory V. Varallo et al., From 
Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments in Special Committee Practice, 53 
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Thus, consistent with the central tradition of Delaware corporate 
-
interested action on part of the fiduciaries to improperly interfere 
-corporate communication have 
sufficient disenfranchising effect to trigger Mercier v. Inter-Tel43 and 
Pell v. Kill44 enhanced judicial scrutiny.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
BUS. LAW. 397, 423 n.121 (1998) (explaining that the two-step Zapata test 
tiny courts use to examine the actions of 
Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 851 (2004) (discussing standard and concluding that 
Zapata is thus quite similar to Unocal  
Network Inc.
which mandate that a court take a more direct and active role in overseeing 
the decisions made and actions taken by directors. In these situations, a court 
., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. 
to two starkly 
divergent categories business judgment rule review reflecting a policy of 
maximal deference to disinterested board decision-making and entire fairness 
review reflecting a policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing 
decisions the Delawar
 
43 Id. See Mercier In prior decisions, this court has 
decided that because board action influencing the election process did not 
have the effect of precluding or coercing stockholder choice, that action was 
not taken for the primary purpose of disenfranchising stockholders. Because 
non-preclusive, non-coercive action did not have the primary purpose of 
disenfranchisement, the Blasius standard did not apply and thus no 
compelling justification for the board's action had to be shown. That is, the 
lack of disenfranchising effect provided that the trigger for the test was not 
. 
44 Judy, 135 A.3d 764 (Del. Ch. 2016) (enjoining plan to reduce size 
of board that would maintain certain defendant directors in the majority and 
facing an electoral contest, incumbent directors are not entitled to determine 
the outcome for the stockholders.  Stockholders elect directors, not the other 
way around.  Even assuming that the Defendant Directors acts for an 
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By nature, directors cannot be expected to remain neutral with 
respect to matters of corporate control.46  This omnipresent, inherent 
conflict of interest when a board, even if independent and otherwise 
disinterested, justifies subjecting fiduciary interference with the 
 to a heightened 
, however subtle, do not 
have the effect of outright impairing the franchise.  In particular, such 
robust judicial review requires inquiry into the context history, 
timing, and content of the boa
 
Invoking an -
handed tactic to 
right to speech, especially in the context of a contest for corporate 
control, is also justified for the reason that the real parties in 
interest the minority equity owners often cannot protect 
themselves at the ballot box by simply replacing the board.  
Furthermore, although establishing that a statement was defamatory 
and made with scienter is a tall order, it is the threat of a retributive 
                                                                                                                 
 
ee also Aquila, Inc. v. 
Quanta Servs., Inc. s 
creation of an employee benefit trust to hold newly issued stock, thereby 
measurably diluting the holdings of a significant stockholder engaged in a 
considered under Unocal). 
45 Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810-11 (explaining that enhanced scrutiny 
review applies to director action that affects stockholder voting requires the 
board to prove that (1) its motivations were proper and not selfish, (2) it did 
not preclude stockholders from exercising their right to vote or coerce them 
into voting a particular way, and (3) the board's actions were reasonable in 
relation to its legitimate objective.  If the fit between means and end is not 
reasonable, then the board falls short.). 
46 Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del.Ch.1987) 
corporation, is likely to prefer to be elected rather than defeated. He therefore 
has a personal interest in the outcome of the election even if the interest is 
. 
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-interest to hinder 
stockholder intracorporate communication rights by miring the vocal 
dissident that supports the utility of judicial-intrusive standard of 
review.   
has the effect of stymieing 
would thus go a long way to provide a 
strong medicine against impermissible interference with stockholders 
franchise.    
Employing the enhanced scrutiny test to the director-
defamation suit in Judy, as an example, would have likely resulted in 
findings that the electoral process has been tainted by inequitable 
behavior of the removed directors. Indeed, the director-
communication rights with other stockholders of the company was 
not a blatant and obvious attempt to interfere with the stockholder 
franchise or otherwise undermined the stockholders' right to act 
directly, but rather a subtle one.  Subtlety, however, does not take 
conduct beyond the realm of equity.  The backdrop of the 
dysfunctional state of affairs of the company under the incumbent 
board's management and the animosity between the factions, support 
the inference that the director-
and perpetuate them, and was not tailored to adequately justify their 
wrongful i
their constitutional speech rights.   
 
CONCLUSION: DIRECTOR INTERFERENCE WITH 
STOCKHOLDERS  INTRA-CORPORATE COMMUNICATION 
RIGHTS MUST REFLECT THE POLICY VALUES EMBODIED IN 
THE ENHANCED SCRUTINY STANDARD 
The preceding discussion highlights the distortion of incentives 
that can arise when an appropriate standard of review is not applied 
in situations of wrongful managerial interference with the right of 
intra-corporate stockholder communication.  In the corporate 
community, employing the level of behavior that will subject a 
corporate director to liability is a highly sensitive and important 
matter.  When courts do not carefully inquire into whether legal 
unication rights 
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may nonetheless be situationally inequitable, they affect director 
behavior in ways that are unintended and undesirable. 
Judy illustrates this proposition, leaving open to directors to 
purposely impinge on the almost sacred right to elect a new board
an area of fundamental importance to stockholders.  To align judicial 
decision-making with the traditional public policy values of fiduciary 
conduct, courts should reassess this decision, and adopt a strict 
doctrinal standard to review actions by corporate fiduciaries that 
affect the right to intra-corporate communication, and as a result 
message to boards and their advisors that they must be very careful 
when taking an action that may have the effect of unconstitutionally 
-corporate communication in other 
words, applying the enhanced standard of review would leave it open 
to boards to exercise their broad authority to manage the affairs of the 
corporation as well as protect their right to reputation, so long as they 
are prepared to justify, in a situationally specific way, their 
behavior ; and (2) better balance the competing interests of 
co













            SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
26             INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS VOL. 14.2 
 
 
 
 
